Philosophical Studies ( IF 1.3 ) Pub Date : 2025-05-17 , DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02280-x
Daniel S. Murphy
According to qualitativism, thisness is not a fundamental feature of reality; facts about particular things are metaphysically second-rate. In this paper, I advance an argument for qualitativism from ideological parsimony. Supposing that reality fundamentally contains an array of propertied things, non-qualitativists employ a distinct name (or constant) for each fundamental thing. I argue that these names encode a type of worldly structure (thisness structure) that offends against parsimony and that qualitativists can eliminate without incurring a comparable parsimony-offense.
中文翻译:

名称中有什么?定性主义和吝啬
根据定性主义,这种性不是现实的基本特征;关于特定事物的事实是形而上彩票大全软件的二流事实。在本文中,我从意识形态的简洁中提出了定性主义的论点。假设现实从根本上包含一系列有产的事物,非定性主义者对每个基本事物都采用一个不同的名称(或常数)。我认为,这些名称编码了一种冒犯吝啬的世俗结构(这种结构),定性主义者可以在不招致类似的吝啬性冒犯的情况下消除这种结构。